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Diesel in Chile receives a different tax treatment depending on its use. If diesel is used in 
industrial activities the diesel tax paid can be used as a credit against VAT and if diesel is 
used in freight or public transportation (basically trucks and buses) a fraction of gasoline 
taxes paid can be used as a credit against VAT. As a result of this different tax treatment 
firms have incentives to use “tax exempted” diesel in activities requiring “non tax exempted” 
diesel. This price wedge generates and opportunity for tax evasion. In this paper we analyze 
the impact of a tax enforcement program implemented by the Chilean IRS, where letters 
requiring information about diesel tax credits were sent to around 200 firms in 2003. Using 
different empirical strategies to consider the non-randomness of the selection of firms, we 
find that firms receiving a letter decreased their diesel tax credits by 16%. 
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Gasoline and diesel are subject to specific taxes and VAT in Chile, but diesel is taxed at a 
much lower rate. Gasoline tax is equivalent to US$1.27 a gallon while diesel tax is just 
US$0.43 a gallon. Additionally, because diesel is used as a main input in several industrial 
activities it receives a special tax treatment depending on its use. Specifically, if diesel is used 
in industrial activities the diesel tax paid can be used as a credit against VAT and if diesel is 
used in freight or public transportation (basically trucks and buses) a fraction of gasoline 
taxes paid can be used as a credit against VAT.1 As a result of this different tax treatment 
firms have incentives to use “tax exempted” diesel in activities requiring “non tax exempted” 
diesel. This might be particularly easy to do for multi-products firms using diesel for several 
activities, allowing them to evade diesel taxes by claiming a larger tax credit than what is 
legally allowed. A similar practice was detected in the U.S. during the 80s where firms were 
buying exempted fuel to be used for on-road tax activities and then created several 
transactions among related firms to hide the tax evasion, a practice known as “daisy chain” 
(Marion and Muehlegger (2008)).2 
 
In 2003 the Chilean IRS implemented a special auditing plan to detect diesel tax 
evasion and improve tax enforcement. For this purpose, the IRS selected first the firms that 
had had large changes in their tax credits reported between 2001 and 2002 and sent them a 
letter asking to voluntarily report more details of every diesel transaction during the last two 
and half years. In October of 2003, 205 firms received the letter asking them to submit the 
information within the next 30 days. The IRS received some type of information from 183 
firms and after revising the information sent by the firms, 66 firms were selected and received 
a second letter for an exhaustive and mandatory audit. This special auditing plan was 
implemented only once in October 2003. 
 
In this paper we use monthly data from October 2002 to September 2004, for all firms 
reporting gasoline tax credits when filing VAT, to estimate the impact of receiving the first 
letter that requested tax information on diesel tax credits claimed. The dataset contains 
detailed information about many relevant dimensions for each firm: size based on sales (very 
                                                
1 The fraction has changed over time. Currently is 80% (after hundreds of trucks blocked the main 
highway for 3 days in 2008 requesting subsidies from the government to compensate the spike in oil prices).  
2 More specifically, firms purchased untaxed diesel fuel and resold it to affiliates to make it more 
difficult to audit the transaction. Then the affiliate resold the diesel to retail gas stations as diesel for which taxes 
had been collected. 
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small, small, medium and large)3, number of different economic activities, tax regime 
(accrual based accounting, cash flow accounting, presumptive tax regime), if it uses an 
accountant for filing taxes, if it has been audited before by the IRS (any auditing, not only 
VAT or diesel) and the year the firm started its operations. 
 
One of the main difficulties in identifying the effects of receiving the first letter from 
the IRS and also the effects of being audited is that, in both cases, the firms were not 
randomly selected. As a matter of fact, the firms that received the letter are quite different 
than the firms that did not receive it in many dimensions that might be correlated with tax 
evasion. For example, 65% of the firms to which the IRS sent the first letter were large firms, 
while only 3.2% of the ones not receiving are large; 98.5% are under accrual accounting tax 
reporting regime, compared to only 37.5% among firms that did not receive the letter.4 For 
this reason, the experimental methods usually used in the literature to identify tax 
enforcements effects on tax compliance (Kleven et al. (2011), Fellner et al (2009), Wenzel 
and Taylor (2004), Blumenthal et al. (2001), Slemrod et al. (2001),) might produce biased 
estimates in the context of our data and cannot be used. 
 
Even though the firms were not randomly selected and the two groups actually differ 
in some relevant dimensions, we know the selection criterion used by the IRS to choose the 
firms to which send the letter. They ranked the firms based on their changed in tax credits 
used between 2002 and 2001 and sent a letter to the first 205. Therefore, the first empirical 
strategy we used to identify the effects of the letter on the diesel tax credit claims by the firms 
is to estimate a difference in difference impact between control and treatment groups 
considering the selection process implemented by the IRS to choose the “treated” firms. The 
selection equation is, therefore, estimated considering the change in the amount of tax credit 
claimed by each firm between 2002 and 2001. Using this method we find that receiving the 
letter reduced diesel tax claims by 19%. 
 
                                                
3 The standard classification used by the government is based on annual sales: less than US$100,000 are 
very small firms; between US$100,000 and US$1,000,000 are small firms; above US$1,000,000 but below 
US$4,200,000 are medium firms; and more than US$4,200,000 are large firms. 
4 In some other dimensions the two groups of firms are not too different, for example 36.6% of the firms 
to which the letter was sent have only one economic activity and 55% are more than 10 years old, compared to 
39.9% and 52% among the firms not receiving the letter respectively. 
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As a second empirical approach to identify the effects of the letter sent by the IRS, we 
constructed and artificial control group using propensity score matching. The results also 
show a statistically significant impact of the letter in reducing the average amount of diesel 
tax credits claim by the “treated” firms even though the magnitude is smaller. The Kernel 
estimator shows a 16.5% reduction in the tax credits claim while the Nearest Neighbor 
estimator shows a 15% reduction.  
 
In general, our results show a significant impact of the letter sent by the IRS, asking 
firms to voluntarily report some information on their diesel tax credits, in reducing the 
amount of tax credits claimed by firms. The results are consistent with other results in the 
literature showing that just receiving a letter from the IRS has an impact on tax compliance 
because it causes a substantial increase in the perceived detection risk (Fellner et al (op.cit.)). 
In that sense, the results show that the IRS in Chile can successfully reduce diesel tax evasion 
by affecting firms’ perceived cost on non-compliance. 
 
 
2. Fuel Taxes in Chile 
Fuel taxes were enacted in Chile in 1986, justified as an instrument to finance road 
construction, especially after a strong earthquake that struck the country in 1985. The tax is 
paid in the first sell or import with a fixed rate by cubic meter. It has to be paid by the 
producer or the importer in the first 10 days after the transfer or before being taken out from 
customs. 
 
 The diesel tax rate is four times lower than the gasoline tax rate with a rate of 1.5 UTM 
by m3, equivalent to 0.44 US dollars per gallon, as opposed to 6 UTM by m3 for gasoline.5 
The gasoline tax is high relative to the United States, but not relative to Europe, while the 
diesel tax (for transportation) is relatively low.  
 
To avoid effects on production efficiency, firms can claim a tax credit for all or a 
share of the diesel tax paid used in activities different from transportation in public roads. 
Starting in October 2001, companies from the trucking industry can claim a credit for a share 
of their diesel purchases, whereas passenger transport companies could only recover 20% of 
                                                
5 The monthly tax unit (UTM) is an index used to maintain the value of taxes in constant money. In 
October 2011, one UTM was worth 38,634 Chilean pesos, around 77 US dollars. 
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their toll expenses6. Specifically, companies owning or leasing trucks with a gross weight of 
3.86 tons or higher can claim 25% of their diesel tax paid as a tax credit against the VAT. 7 
 
Tax revenue, credit claims and the number of firms claiming the tax credit have 
changed over time because of changes in diesel prices and regulation. The diesel tax revenue 
increased between 2000 and 2009 in 97.9%, while over the same time period, diesel VAT 
credit has increased in 192.3%. The percentage of the diesel tax that is claimed as VAT credit 
has increased from 48.06% to 70.9%. Absent of a diesel price change, the rate of recovery 
(VAT credit / diesel tax revenue) of each firm should be constant over time unless there is 
either a change in their productive process that modify the use of diesel or a normative 
change.  
 
The rate of recovery can also be affected by changes in consumer behavior, 
specifically, in tax evasion. The diesel tax credit creates a wedge in diesel prices depending 
on its use: there is a price for diesel used in transportation, a lower price for diesel used in the 
trucking sector and an even lower price for diesel used in manufacturing. These different 
prices generate incentives to use “tax exempted” diesel in activities that should pay diesel tax. 
 
Tax evasion can occur in several different ways. Firms can buy diesel for 
manufacturing, and then use it for transportation, firms can pay services with diesel, and 
transportation firms can claim the diesel credit for all their operations, not only for their 
national use which is what they are legally allow to do. Additionally, diesel from the firm can 
be used for the diesel cars of the owners and managers of the firm. Some of these 
mechanisms were detected by the IRS, which motivated the implementation of a special 
enforcement program for diesel taxation with the goal of reducing its evasion. 
 
 
                                                
6 The Law No. 20.278 increased the share of toll expenses that can be recovered to 35% 
starting on January 2009. We will not consider the passenger transportation industry because it does 
not have a diesel tax credit. 
7 The Law No. 19.764 established a phase-in period of 3 years ofr the diesel tax credit. The 
share of the diesel tax paid that could be claimed as tax credit was 10% in 2001-2002, 20% in 2003 
and 25% since January 2004. Then, the Law No. 20.278 increased the share to 80% for the period 
between July 2008 and June 2009. Finally, the Law No. 20.360 established a recovery share based on 
anual sales. Firms with annual sales below 18.600 UTM can claim as a tax credit 80% of their diesel 
tax paid, firms with sales above 18,600 UTM and below 42,500 UTM can claim 50%, and firms with 
sales above 42,500 UTM can claim 38%. 
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3. The Diesel Tax Enforcement Program 
In 2003 the Chilean IRS implemented a special auditing plan to detect diesel tax evasion and 
improve tax enforcement. The IRS selected the firms that had had large changes in the tax 
credits reported between 2001 and 2002 and sent them a letter asking to report more details of 
every diesel transaction.  
 
The letter says: “The IRS will start an auditing program for taxpayers claiming diesel 
tax credits. For this reason you should send the following information to the IRS 
–Diesel purchases between January 2001 and August 2003 
–Diesel tax paid 
–Quantity and fraction of diesel used by vehicles 
–List and registration number of vehicles owned by the firm, including year, maker, 
model, mpg and monthly miles traveled. 
 The requirement to send this information does not imply you are going to be 
audited. In case your firm is selected for a detailed auditing you will receive a new letter from 
the IRS.” 
 
In October of 2003, 205 firms received the letter asking them to submit the 
information within the next 30 days. As it was mentioned before, firms were chosen 
according to their previous increase in diesel tax credit. Using the IRS data we replicate this 
decision rule and find out that the letter was not sent to 22 of the top 200 firms8, and that the 
letter was also sent to 20 firms that were not in the top 200.9 
 
The IRS received some type of information from 183 firms out of the 205 that 
received the letter and after revising the information sent by the firms, 66 firms were selected 
and received a second letter for an exhaustive and mandatory audit. This special auditing plan 
was implemented only once in October 2003. In this paper, we focus on the effect of the first 
letter. 
 
Theoretically, the letter sent by the IRS could potentially reduce the amount of tax 
credits claimed by firms after receiving it. Marion and Muehlegger (2008) using a simple 
                                                
8 Firms ranked in places 2,3,6,11,29,30,34,38,62,69,77,79,100, 115, 123,147,150,153,158,175,193 and 
196. 
9 Ranked 202 to 223, except 210. 
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model, where firms choose the fraction of untaxed diesel purchases they use to produce 
output conditional on their evasion cost, show that an increase in the probability of auditing 
by the IRS reduces the fraction of untaxed diesel purchases by the firms. If the letter sent by 
the IRS has the effect of increasing the perceived probability of being audited by the firms, 
then the amounts of tax credits claimed should decreased from evading firms. The empirical 
question then is if this happen or not and to what extent. 
 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Data 
We use IRS monthly data from October 2002 to September 2004 for small, medium and 
large firms reporting diesel tax credit every month (N=2.408)10. Firms of four economic 
sectors were included in the enforcement program so in the data base we have firms on 
transportation (except passenger transportation), manufacturing, commerce and construction. 
The data include sales, VAT credits and debits, diesel credits, economic sector, accounting 
system/tax regime, number of different economic activities and firms’ age of 2.307 not 
notified firms and 101 notified firms.11 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the data we use in the empirical analysis. The 
average monthly diesel tax credit is $794,652, with a standard deviation of $4,123,867. The 
letter was sent to 4.02% of all credit users of the sample. The credit users are mostly very 
small firms (67.5%), and large firms represent only 13.5%. The main economic sector 
claiming the tax credit is, as expected, transportation (69.5%), followed by manufacturing 
and construction. Regarding the type of tax reporting, 72.5% of the sample uses accrual 
reporting and 20.1% pay according to presumptive tax (Even though presumptive taxes are 
used only in three economic sectors in Chile (mining, agriculture, and transportation)). The 
average number of tax reported activities is 2.3, with a maximum of 17, and most of the firms 
are 10 years or more.  
 
 
                                                
10 Very small firms are excluded since none of them received a letter in the tax enforcement 
program 
11 The original data has N=21,876 firms. In this version of the paper we only use those firms 
that have claimed diesel credits in all the period analyzed to focus on the extensive margin response to 
the letters sent by the IRS. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
	   	   	   	   	   	  
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm Characteristics           
Letter 2408 0,042 0,201 0 1 
Number Activities 2407 2,345 1,672 1 17 
Construction 2408 0,080 0,271 0 1 
Transport 2408 0,695 0,461 0 1 
Manufacturing 2408 0,154 0,361 0 1 
Commerce 2408 0,071 0,257 0 1 
Small Firm 2408 0,675 0,469 0 1 
Medium Firm 2408 0,190 0,392 0 1 
Large Firm 2408 0,135 0,342 0 1 
Age between 0 and 2 2407 0,014 0,118 0 1 
Age between 2 and 4 2407 0,147 0,354 0 1 
Age between 5 and 6 2407 0,120 0,326 0 1 
Age between 7 and 10 2407 0,137 0,344 0 1 
Older than 10 2407 0,582 0,493 0 1 
Accrual Reporting 2408 0,725 0,447 0 1 
Presumptive Tax 2408 0,201 0,401 0 1 
      
Monthly Data      
Diesel Tax Credit 45752 794252 4123867 150 135000000 
VAT Reported 45752 5865571 45900000 0 2580000000 
Source: author’s calculations based on IRS data. 
 
 
Table 2 shows firms’ descriptive statistics by letter status, which will be relevant to 
frame the empirical strategy, and the results of a t-test for the mean difference between 
notified and non-notified firms for each characteristic. As expected because the letter was not 
sent to a random sample of firms, notified and not notified firms are statistically different in 
many dimensions. Notified firms have more activities (which can give more opportunities for 
evasion), are more likely to be in construction or commerce, are larger, older and have 
smaller reported VAT. Interestingly, none of them have the presumptive tax regime. These 
differences in observable variables challenge the identification of the effect of the letter on 
the diesel credit requested. Interpretations of correlation found between receiving the letter 
and the credit claims should consider the possibility that they are caused by these different 
characteristics, and not related to the letter. In the next section, we propose an empirical 





Table 2: Mean Characteristics by Treatment Elegibility 
 
 Not Notified Notified 
Difference  (N=2.307) (N=101) 
  Mean Std. Desv. Mean Std. Desv. Mean ttest 
Number Activities 2,328 1,643 2,743 2,208 -0,415 -2,443 
Construction 0,069 0,253 0,327 0,471 -0,258 -9,533 
Transport 0,710 0,454 0,347 0,478 0,363 7,860 
Manufacturing 0,153 0,360 0,178 0,385 -0,025 -0,674 
Commerce 0,068 0,251 0,149 0,357 -0,081 -3,103 
Small Firm 0,702 0,457 0,050 0,218 0,653 14,269 
Medium Firm 0,185 0,388 0,297 0,459 -0,112 -2,812 
Large Firm 0,113 0,316 0,653 0,478 -0,541 -16,386 
Age between 0 and 2 0,015 0,121 0,000 0,000 0,015 1,229 
Age between 2 and 4 0,146 0,353 0,158 0,367 -0,012 -0,341 
Age between 5 and 6 0,122 0,327 0,089 0,286 0,033 0,989 
Age between 7 and 10 0,138 0,345 0,109 0,313 0,029 0,830 
Older than 10 0,579 0,494 0,644 0,481 -0,064 -1,280 
VAT repoted (log) 10,371 6,009 9,064 8,164 1,308 2,104 
Accrual Reporting 0,713 0,453 1,000 0,000 -0,287 -6,379 
Presumptive Tax 0,209 0,407 0,000 0,000 0,209 5,169 
Source: author’s calculations based on IRS data. 
 
 
4.2 Econometric Specification 
As we previously noted, the notified sample is not comparable to the not notified sample, and 
therefore we cannot just directly compare the outcomes of treated and untreated firms. We 
study the effect of this tax enforcement program with two approaches: difference in 
difference with selection correction and matching estimator. 
 
First, we compare the diesel tax credits of notified firms to the ones of not notified 
firms after the program was implemented. This is, we do a difference in difference where the 
first difference is time, and the second being in the notified group. Even though the firms 
were not randomly selected and the two groups actually differ in some relevant dimensions, 
in the case of the first letter sent by the IRS we know that the selection of firms was based on 
the changed in tax credits used between 2002 and 2001. We use this fact to estimate the 
selection process with our data, and then incorporate the inverse mills ratio to consistently 
estimate the average treatment effect. Therefore, the first empirical strategy we used to 
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identify the effects of the letter on the diesel tax credit claims by the firms is to estimate a 
difference in difference impact between control and treatment groups considering the 
selection process implemented by the IRS to choose the “treated” firms. The selection 
equation is, therefore, estimated considering the change in the amount of tax credit claimed 
by each firm between 2002 and 2001. 
 
Let Ti=1,0 indicate if the firm was notified, Ai=1,0 indicate if the observation is 
before or after the letter was send, Yi the diesel tax credit (the outcome of interest) and Xi a 
set of firm i characteristics, then the empirical specification is: 
 
Ti =θ +σΔcrediti +µi
Yi =α +βTi *Ai +γ1Ti +γ2Ai +γ3Xi +λIMRi +εi
 
 
The identification assumption under this first approach is that notified and not notified 
firms have a parallel trend on their diesel tax credits (Yi). The second approach consists of 




As a benchmark case, we estimated first the impact of the letter using the panel of firms with 
random effects (a Hausman test does not reject random effects with respect to fixed effects). 
Table 3 shows the results of the benchmark case. The variable letter is a dummy equal to 1 
for the firms receiving the first letter from the IRS, the variable After Letter is a dummy equal 
to 1 for the months after the letter was sent, and the variable Letter*After Letter is the 
interaction of the two variables whose coefficient represents therefore a difference in 
difference estimator. The first column show the results of the estimation without considering 
additional controls; the second column shows the results adding monthly and year dummies; 
and the third column shows the results of the regression including several firm’s 
characteristics as explanatory variables.12 The difference in difference estimator shows 
consistently a statistically significant decrease of around 19% in tax credit claims by the 
treated firms after receiving the letter. 
                                                
12 Additionally, model (3) was also estimated using Jacknife to address the potential existence 
of outliers driving the results, but the results were almost identical. 
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Table 3: Random Effects Panel 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log Diesel Tax Credit       
Notification 3.064*** 3.064*** 1.678*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.109) 
After Letter 0.200*** -0.0579** -0.0585** 
 (0.00580) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
Notification*After Letter -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0274) (0.0274) 
Number Activities   0.0531*** 
   (0.0127) 
Commerce   -0.0375 
   (0.0840) 
Manufacturing   0.0940 
   (0.0618) 
Construction   0.217** 
   (0.0827) 
Small Firm   -1.871*** 
   (0.0717) 
Medium Firm   -0.777*** 
   (0.0759) 
Age between 2 and 4   -0.0542 
   (0.180) 
Age between 5 and 6   0.115 
   (0.181) 
Age between 7 and 10   -0.00643 
   (0.181) 
Older than 10   0.0602 
   (0.174) 
VAT reported (log)   0.00455*** 
   (0.000569) 
Accrual Accounting   0.372*** 
   (0.0824) 
Presumptive Tax   -0.339*** 
   (0.0899) 
Constant 11.80*** 11.37*** 12.40*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0326) (0.210) 
Montrly Dummies No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 45752 45752 45733 
R2 0.155 0.164 0.464 
Wald 1701.9 4801.4 6969.7 
Standard errors in parentheses  * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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Table 4 shows the results of estimating the same equation as in the benchmark case, 
but considering the non-random selection of firms, estimating for this purpose a selection 
equation first. As before, the first column shows the results of the estimation without any 
controls; the second column includes months and year dummies in the regression; and the last 
column includes firms’ characteristics.13 The difference-in-difference estimator shows again a 
significant impact of the letter on diesel tax credit claims. On average, the letter had the 
impact of reducing the amount of credits reported by the treated firms in 16%. This result is 
quite robust to the different specifications and is not quite different than the one obtained 
using random effects panel. 
 
It is also important to highlight in the results that the amount of tax credits claimed by 
firms is increasing with the number of different economic sector in which firms report 
activities, showing that it is probably easier to evade taxes for multi-sector firms. 


















                                                
13 As before, model (3) was also estimated using Jacknife to address the potential existence of 
outliers driving the results, but the results were again almost identical. 
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Table 4: Heckman Selection 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log Diesel Tax Credit       
After Letter 0.199*** -0.0592** -0.0595** 
 (0.00496) (0.0213) (0.0200) 
Notification*After Letter -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0294) (0.0275) 
Number Activities   0.0539*** 
   (0.00139) 
Commerce   -0.0109 
   (0.0120) 
Manufacturing   0.0241*** 
   (0.00652) 
Construction   0.365*** 
   (0.0103) 
Small Firm   -2.043*** 
   (0.00880) 
Medium Firm   -0.883*** 
   (0.00964) 
Age between 2 and 4   -0.0304 
   (0.0274) 
Age between 5 and 6   0.135*** 
   (0.0277) 
Age between 7 and 10   0.0195 
   (0.0263) 
Older than 10   0.0777** 
   (0.0266) 
VAT reported (log)   0.00461*** 
   (0.000567) 
Accrual Accounting   0.386*** 
   (0.0117) 
Presumptive Tax   -0.331*** 
   (0.0120) 
Constant 17.98*** 17.55*** 16.46*** 
  (0.0413) (0.0555) (0.0604) 
Letter    
Diff. Diesel Tax Credit 2002-2001 1.17E-09 1.17E-09 1.17E-09 
 (1.27E-10) (1.27E-10) (1.27E-10) 
Lambda (Inverse Mills) -2.753*** -2.754*** -1.772*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0229) (0.0198) 
Montly Dummies No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 45752 45752 45733 
R2 0.0676 0.0758 0.451 
Wald 31946.0 31237.3 292987.1 
 14 
Standard errors in parentheses  * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
As a second empirical approach to identify the effects of the letter sent by the IRS, we 
constructed an artificial control group using propensity score matching. Table 5 shows the 
results of the matching estimation using the Kernel and the Nearest Neighbor estimators. In 
both cases, the results show a statistically significant impact of the letter in reducing the 
average amount of diesel tax credits claim by the “treated” firms even though the magnitude 
differ somewhat importantly. The Kernel estimator shows a 16.5% reduction in the tax 
credits claim while the Nearest Neighbor estimator shows a 15% reduction, a bit smaller 
magnitudes than the previous results. 
 




ATT -0.165 -0.1489 




A differential diesel tax treatment in Chile creates incentives for firms to use “tax 
exempted” diesel in activities requiring “non tax exempted” diesel. This might be particularly 
easy to do for multi-products firms using diesel for several activities, allowing them to evade 
diesel taxes by claiming a larger tax credit than the legally allowed. 
In an attempt to reduce potential evasion of diesel taxes and improve tax enforcement, 
the Chilean IRS sent a letter to some firms asking to voluntarily report more details of every 
diesel transaction during the last year. In this work we evaluate the impact of the letter on 
firms’ behavior. The results show a significant impact of the letter sent by the IRS in 
reducing the amount of tax credits claimed by firms. On average, treated firms reduce their 
tax credits claims by around 16% after receiving the letter. The results are consistent with 
other results in the literature showing that just receiving a letter from the IRS has an impact 
on tax compliance because it causes a substantial increase in the perceived detection risk 
(Fellner et al (op.cit.)). In that sense, the results show that the IRS in Chile can successfully 
reduce diesel tax evasion by affecting firms’ perceived cost on non-compliance. It would be 
important to consider in future research what happens in the long run. It could be possible 
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that future letters would not have the same effect or even that the effect of the letter fades out 
in time and firms go back to the over-reporting practice.  
Future work includes analyzing the impact of the letter in the intensive margin and 
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Tables A1, A2, and A3 show frequency statistics of the data based on some of the 
most relevant firm’s characteristics, separating the sample between firms receiving the letter 
and not. The first two rows show the total number and fraction of firms by firm size for those 
not receiving it, the second two rows show the same information for firms that did receive the 
letter. 
As we can see in the tables that firms that received the letter are older, (64% have 
more than 10 years compared to 57.9% of not audited), are more concentrated in construction 
and commerce and are mostly big firms (65.4% of audited firms are “big”, compared to 
11.3% of non audited firms).14 
 
Table A1: Firm Size by Treatment Status 	  
	   	   	   	   	  
  Size (sales) 
  Small Medium Large Total 
Not Notified 1.620 427 260 2.307 
  70,2 18,5 11,3 100 
Notified 5 30 66 101 
  5,0 29,7 65,4 100 
Total 1.625 457 326 2.408 
  67,5 19,0 13,5 100 
 
 
Table A2: Economic Sector by Treatment Status 	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
  Economic Sector 
  Transport Manufacturing Construction Commerce Total 
Not Notified 1.638 354 159 156 2.307 
  71,0 15,3 6,9 6,8 100 
Notified 35 18 33 15 101 
  34,7 17,8 32,7 14,9 100 
Total 1.673 372 192 171 2.408 






                                                
14 In some other dimensions the two groups of firms are not too different, for example 36.6% of the 
firms to which the letter was sent have only one economic activity and 55% are more than 10 years old, 
compared to 39.9% and 52% among the firms not receiving the letter respectively. 
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Table A3: Firm Age by Treatment Status 	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
  Age in Years 
  0-2 2-5 5-7 7-10 10+ Total 
Not Notified 34 337 281 318 1.336 2.306 
  1,5 14,6 12,2 13,8 57,9 100 
Notified 0 16 9 11 65 101 
  0,0 15,8 8,9 10,9 64,4 100 
Total 34 353 290 329 1.401 2.407 
  1,4 14,7 12,1 13,7 58,2 100 
 
 
